



ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΑΠΟΦΘΕΥΓΜΑΤΑ

ARISTOTLE QUOTATIONS

Physica-Φυσικά

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις μὲν ἔστιν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς, ἡ δὲ μέθοδος ἡμῖν περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τί ἐστι κίνησις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἀγνοουμένης αὐτῆς ἀγνοεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν.

(*Φυσικά*, III.i, 200b12-15)

Since nature itself is a principle of movement and change, and if it is nature that we are studying, we must understand what movement is, for, if we do not know this, neither do we understand what nature is. (*Physica*, III.i, 200b12-15)

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Πότερον δὲ μὴ οὐσίας ψυχῆς εἴη ἂν ὁ χρόνος ἢ οὐ, ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις. (*Φυσικά*, 223a 21)

One might raise the question whether, if there were no soul there would be time or not." (*Physica*, 223a 21)

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Διὸ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντα περιέχεσθαι ὑπὸ χρόνου, ὥσπερ καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα ἐν τινὶ ἐστίν, οἷον τὰ ἐν τόπῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ τόπου... καὶ ταύτην μάλιστα λέγειν εἰώθαμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου φθοράν... οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' οὐδὲ ταύτην ὁ χρόνος ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεσθαι καὶ ταύτην τὴν μεταβολὴν (*Φυσικά*, IV.xii, 221a25 222b26)

So it is necessary that for all things that are in time, must be contained by time, just as other things also which are in something; for instance, the things in place, by place... we use to attribute the coming to be and the perishing of things to time ... after all, it is not really time itself that does this, but this kind of change, too, happens to take place in time. (*Physica*, IV.xii, 221a 25-222b 26)

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De partibus animalium/ Περὶ ζώων μορίων

Τῶν οὐσιῶν ὅσαι φύσει συνεστᾶσι, τὰς μὲν ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους εἶναι τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα, τὰς δὲ μετέχειν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. .. περὶ δὲ τῶν φθαρτῶν φυτῶν τε καὶ ζώων εὐποροῦμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διὰ τὸ σύντροφον· πολλὰ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος λάβοι τις ἂν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων βουλόμενος διαπονεῖν ἱκανῶς. [...] Διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμωτέρων ζώων ἐπίσκεψιν. Ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἔνεστί τι θαυμαστόν·

(*Περὶ ζώων μορίων*, I, 644b22-31 & 645a15-17)

Among the substantial things constituted by nature, some are ungenerated and imperishable throughout all eternity, while others partake of generation and perishing. . . . We are, however, much better provided in relation to knowledge about the perishable plants and animals, because we live among them. For anyone wishing to labour sufficiently can grasp many things about each kind. [...] For this reason we should not be childishly disgusted at the examination of the less valuable animals. For in all natural things there is something marvellous.

(*De partibus animalium* I 644b22-31 & 645a15-17)

Metaphysica / Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά

Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναί ὀρέγονται φύσει. (*Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*, I.I.980a 22)

All men by nature desire to know. (*Metaphysica*, I.I.980a 22)

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οὐ γὰρ δεῖν ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἄλλ' ἐπιτάττειν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτον ἐτέρῳ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τὸν ἥττον σοφόν. (*Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*, I.I.982a 17-19)

The wise man must not be ordered but must order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey him. (*Metaphysica*, I.I.982a 17-19)

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οἱ φάσκοντες οὐδὲν λέγειν τὰς μαθηματικὰς ἐπιστήμας περὶ καλοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ ψεύδονται. λέγουσι γὰρ καὶ δεικνύουσι μάλιστα· οὐ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ὀνομάζουσι τὰ δ' ἔργα καὶ τοὺς λόγους δεικνύουσιν, οὐ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν. τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὀρισμένον, ἃ μάλιστα δεικνύουσιν αἱ μαθηματικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι.

(*Μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*, XIII.3. 1078a 33-1078b 2)

Those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove a great deal about them; if they do not expressly mention them, but prove attributes which are their results or definitions, it is not true that they tell us nothing about them. The chief forms of beauty are order

and symmetry and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. (*Metaphysica*, XIII.3. 1078a 33-1078b 2)

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Ethica Nicomachea/ Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια

πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἢ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.

(*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια*, I.3. 1094.b24-28)

It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs. (*Ethica Nicomachea*, I.3. 1094.b24-28)

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ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. (*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια*, I.5. 1096.a5-7)

The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. (*Ethica Nicomachea*, I.5. 1096.a5-7)

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ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντων φίλων ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. (*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια*, I.6. 1096.a16-17)

Piety requires us to honor truth above our friends. (*Ethica Nicomachea*, I.6. 1096.a16-17)

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τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἔν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν. (*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια*, I.8. 1098.b23-29)

For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Now

... it is not probable that these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects. (*Ethica Nicomachea*, I.8. 1098.b23-29)

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τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἐκάστω δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτιοιοῦτος,... τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ'εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα· τοιαῦται δ' αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις,... ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἡδιστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώριστα ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα... κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν... ἡδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν. (*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια* I.8. 1099.a7-28)

For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant.... Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such... Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos: Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health; but pleasantest is it to win what we love.

(*Ethica Nicomachea* , I.8. 1099.a7-28)

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τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφορον πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν. (*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια*, I.10. 1101.a1-3)

The truly good and wise man will bear all kinds of fortune in a seemly way, and will always act in the noblest manner that the circumstances allow. (*Ethica Nicomachea*, I.10. 1101.a1-3)

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καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποίας ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν. (*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια*, II.1. 1103.b21-24)

In a word, acts of any kind produce habits or characters of the same kind. Hence we ought to make sure that our acts are of a certain kind; for the resulting character varies as they vary. It makes no small difference, therefore, whether a man be trained in his youth up in this way or that, but a great difference, or rather all the difference.

(*Ethica Nicomachea*, II.1. 1103.b21-24)

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Ἄλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὁμοίον τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. (*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια* II.4. 1105.b12-16)

It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good. But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do. (*Ethica Nicomachea*, II.4. 1105.b12-16)

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καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὐρίσκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι. (*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια* II.6. 1107.a3-6)

The vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate.

(*Ethica Nicomachea*, II.6. 1107.a3-6)

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οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὧς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον.

(*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια*, II.9. 1109.a26-29)

Any one can get angry — that is easy — or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy.

(*Ethica Nicomachea*, II.9. 1109.a26-29)

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ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἔλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα
(*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια*, VIII.1. 1155.a5-6)

Without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods. (*Ethica Nicomachea*, VIII.1. 1155.a5-6)

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καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, (*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια*, VIII.1. 1155.a26-27)

When people are friends, they have no need of justice, but when they are just, they need friendship in addition. (*Ethica Nicomachea*, VIII.1. 1155.a26-27)

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φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα. (*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια*, IX.8. 1168.b1-3)

The best friend is he that, when he wishes a person's good, wishes it for that person's own sake. (*Ethica Nicomachea*, IX.8. 1168.b1-3)

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Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἔπεται διελεῖν. μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συμφερεῖσθαι τῷ γενεῖ ἡμῶν, διὸ παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ. διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, ῥοπήν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμοναβίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν· ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. (*Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια*, X.1. 1172.a19-27)

After these matters we ought perhaps next to discuss pleasure. For it is thought to be most intimately connected with our human nature, which is the reason why in educating the young we steer them by the rudders of pleasure and pain; it is thought, too, that to enjoy the things we ought and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing on virtue of character. For these things extend right through life, with a weight and power of their own in respect both to virtue and to the happy life, since men choose what is pleasant and avoid what is painful; and such things, it will be thought, we should least of all omit to discuss, especially since they admit of much dispute. (*Ethica Nicomachea*, X.1. 1172.a19-27)

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Politica/ Πολιτικά

«Ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ὡς φύσει κοινωνικὸν καὶ πολιτικόν». (*Πολιτικά*, I. 2, 1253a 1-3)

ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον. (*Politica*, I. 2, 1253a 1-3)

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... ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐθὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός. (*Πολιτικά*, I.2. 1253a 26-29)

Αυτός που δεν μπορεί να ζήσει μέσα στην κοινωνία, ή που δεν έχει καμία ανάγκη διότι είναι αυτάρκης, θα πρέπει να είναι είτε θηρίο είτε θεός. (*Politica*, I.2. 1253a 26-29)

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ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθεὶς βέλτιστον τῶν ζώων ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ χωρισθεὶς νόμου καὶ δίκης χείριστον πάντων. (*Πολιτικά*, I.2. 1253a 31-33)

Man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all. (*Politica*, I.2. 1253a 31-33)

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πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους ἔαν ἀκινήτους βέλτιον. (*Πολιτικά*, II.8. 1269a 8-9)

Even when [laws](#) have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered. (*Politica*, II.8. 1269a 8-9)

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διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. (*Πολιτικά*, III.16. 1287.a32)

The law is reason unaffected by desire. (*Politica*, III.16. 1287.a32)

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καὶ τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτ' ἐν ἀρετῆτοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τῷ ἥθει μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολὴν, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἔξω κτήσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκεῖνα μὲν κεκτημένοις πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐλλείπουσιν. (*Πολιτικά*, VII.1. 1323.b1-6)

Happiness whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more often found with those who are highly cultivated in their minds and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities. (*Politica* VII.1. 1323.b1-6)

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βάνουσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων [ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. (*Πολιτικά*, 8. 1337b 8-11).

And any occupation, art, or science, which makes the body or soul or mind of the freeman less fit for the practice or exercise of excellence, is mechanical" (*Politica*, 8. 1337b 8-11).

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Rhetorica

καὶ μεγαλόψυχοι (οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου πω τεταπείνωνται, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄπειροί εἰσιν, καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν αὐτὸν μεγάλων μεγαλοψυχία· τοῦτο δ' εὐέλπιδος). καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων· τῷ γὰρ ἤθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ... καὶ ἅπαντα ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ σφοδρότερον ἀμαρτάνουσι, παρὰ τὸ Χιλώνειον (πάντα γὰρ ἄγαν πράττουσιν· φιλοῦσι γὰρ ἄγαν καὶ μισοῦσιν ἄγαν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὁμοίως). (*Ρητορική*, II. 12. 1389a30-1389b5)

The young have exalted notions, because they have not been humbled by life or learned its necessary limitations; moreover, their hopeful disposition makes them think themselves equal to great things—and that means having exalted notions. They would always rather do noble deeds than useful ones: Their lives are regulated more by moral feeling than by reasoning.... All their mistakes are in the direction of doing things excessively and vehemently. They overdo everything; they love too much, hate too much, and the same with everything else. (*Rhetorica*, II. 12. 1389a30-1389b5)

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Poetica

ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μίμησις πράξεως... δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. (*Περὶ Ποιητικῆς*, VI. 1449b23-28)

A tragedy, then, is the imitation of an action ... with incidents arousing pity and fear, where with to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions. (*Poetica*, VI. 1449b23-28)

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διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποιήσις ἱστορίας ἐστίν: ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποιήσις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει.
(*Περὶ Ποιητικῆς*, IX, 1451.b5-7)

Poetry is finer and more philosophical than history; for poetry expresses the universal, and history only the particular. (*Poetica*, IX, 1451.b5-7)

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πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυΐας τε σημείον ἐστὶ· τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστίν. (*Περὶ Ποιητικῆς*, XXII, 1459.a5-8)

But the greatest thing by far is to have a command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by another; it is the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances. (*Poetica*, XXII, 1459.a5-8)

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πρός τε γὰρ τὴν ποιήσιν αἰρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον ἢ ἀπίθανον καὶ δυνατόν·
(*Περὶ Ποιητικῆς*, XV, 1461.b11-12)

For the purposes of poetry a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility. (*Poetica*, XV, 1461.b11-12)